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Casenote
What's the "Use": Vehicle
Maintenance Liability Barred by
Sovereign Immunity Amendment
Intended to Promote Waiver*
I. INTRODUCTION
Local government is an active participant in most communities. It
picks up trash weekly, keeps tap water clean, and keeps citizens safe.
Local government is the cog that keeps communities running smoothly,
and as such, is afforded certain protections. One of those protections is
the protection from lawsuits brought by citizens. This is known as the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.' While local government reaches out into
the community to keep citizens comfortable and safe, sovereign immunity
keeps citizens from reaching in and exposing the government to liability.
At times, however, these protections can seem unjust. In 2002, the
Georgia General Assembly made an attempt to address such concerns by
amending an existing statute to promote the waiver of sovereign
immunity. 2 The decision in Columbus Consolidated Government v.
Woody 3 addresses a matter of first impression concerning this statute

*To my favorite lawyer, my wife, Morgan, thank you for always believing in me and
inspiring me to reach a little further with your kind words and incredible example. None of
this would be possible without the sacrifices you have so lovingly made. Mom, Dad, Brenda,
and Nicki, thank you for investing in me and for teaching me what is important in this life.
Professor Creswell, thank you for your guidance and for giving me the confidence to make
this Casenote my own. You made this case interesting and made me feel like a colleague in
the process. I certainly enjoyed that experience and will remember it fondly.
1. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 745, 452 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1994).
2. Bradley S. Wolff et al., Insurance, 54 MERCER L. REV. 341, 347 (2002).
3. 342 Ga. App. 233, 802 S.E.2d 717 (2017).
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and exposes the likely unintended consequences of the 2002 amendment,
which appears to require further attention from the General Assembly.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the fall of 2011, while on a prisoner work detail, Woody was injured
when sparks caused his jumpsuit to ignite. This occurred while Woody
was welding a garbage truck belonging to the Columbus Consolidated
Government. A personal injury suit followed in which Columbus filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that sovereign immunity
barred Woody's claims.4 Columbus argued, pursuant to the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 33-24-51(b),5 that Woody's
injuries did not arise out of the "negligent use" of a motor vehicle, and
therefore, sovereign immunity was not waived. The trial court disagreed
and denied Columbus' motion, allowing Woody to bring suit. 6
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged a question of
first impression concerning the language of O.C.G.A. § 36-92-27 and the
amended language of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b). 8 The court ultimately
agreed with Columbus and reversed the trial court's ruling.9
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. HistoricalApplication Priorto the Amendment
Prior to the 2002 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b),1o a local
government's decision whether to purchase automobile liability
insurance had significant consequences. When a local government entity
purchased such liability insurance to provide "coverage for the negligence
of any . . . employee in the performance of his official duties, its

4. Id. at 239, 802 S.E.2d at 722. Woody's complaint made no allegations that
Columbus maintained an automobile liability insurance policy. Id.
5. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (2017).
6. Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 233-34, 802 S.E.2d at 718-19.
7. O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2 (2017).
8. Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 237, 802 S.E.2d at 720.
9. Id. at 239, 802 S.E.2d at 722.
10. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (2001). Prior to the amendment, subsection (b) read, in part,
as follows:
Whenever a municipal corporation, a county, or any other political subdivision
of this state shall purchase the insurance authorized by subsection (a) of this
Code section to provide liability coverage for the negligence of any duly
authorized officer, agent, servant, attorney, or employee in the performance of
his official duties, its governmental immunity shall be waived to the extent of
the amount of insurance so purchased.
Id.
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governmental immunity [was] waived to the extent of the amount of
insurance so purchased." Thus, if a government entity had purchased
liability insurance and someone was injured "by reason of ownership,
maintenance, operation, or use of any motor vehicle,"1 2 the government's
immunity was waived, and the injured party could sue for damages up to
the amount of insurance provided.' 3 However, if the local government
entity did not maintain an automobile liability insurance policy,
sovereign immunity was not waived.1 4 The following cases demonstrate
the issues the court faced prior to and after the amendment of O.C.G.A.
§ 33-24-51.15
In Chamlee v. Henry County Board of Education,6 a student sued the
board of education (Board) after being injured while driving a teacher's
car during automotive shop class. As part of the class, students worked
on teachers' and other students' vehicles to gain experience in automotive
maintenance. To ensure that repairs were complete, students were
allowed to test drive the vehicles. The injured party in this suit was
Samuel Chamlee. Chamlee's parents filed suit on his behalf claiming that
the Board failed to establish policies to prevent such an accident. The
trial court granted summary judgment to the Board on the grounds of
sovereign immunity. 17
On appeal, the Chamlees argued that since the Board maintained
liability insurance, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(a),1s the trial court
erred in holding them barred from recovery by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.' 9 During review, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted that
"[t]he mere purchase of insurance coverage does not constitute waiver." 20
11. Id.
12. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(a) (2001).
13. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b).
14. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (2001).
15. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (2017).
16. 239 Ga. App. 183, 521 S.E.2d 78 (1999).
17. Id. at 183, 521 S.E.2d at 78-79.
18. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(a) (2017). Subsection (a) was not changed during the 2002
amendment. It reads as follows:
A municipal corporation, a county, or any other political subdivision of this state
is authorized in its discretion to secure and provide insurance to cover liability
for damages on account of bodily injury or death resulting from bodily injury to
any person or for damage to property of any person, or for both arising by reason
of ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of any motor vehicle by the
municipal corporation, county, or any other political subdivision of this state
under its management, control, or supervision, whether in a governmental
undertaking or not, and to pay premiums for the insurance coverage.
Id.
19. Chamlee, 239 Ga. App. at 185, 521 S.E.2d at 80.
20. Id.
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Rather, the insurance purchased must provide for the negligence of any
authorized officer in the performance of his official duties arising by
reason of "ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of a motor
vehicle." 21 The Chamlees argued that even though the shop class teacher
was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, he was technically
using it in his official capacity as a teacher. 22 The court ultimately held
that an issue of fact remained with regard to the teacher's "use" of the
vehicle and that summary judgment was improper based solely on the
fact that the teacher was not personally driving the vehicle when the
accident occurred. 23 While the court did not rule on the scope of the term
"use," its holding demonstrated an openness to a broad interpretation, as
well as an acknowledgment that injury arising by reason of ownership,
maintenance, or operation is actionable. 24
In Cameron v. Lang,25 the Georgia Supreme Court heard two cases on
a consolidated appeal from the Georgia Court of Appeals regarding auto
accidents involving police officers in high-speed chases. 26 In the first case,
a City of Savannah police car hit a civilian's vehicle while in pursuit of a
fleeing suspect. The police car ran a stop sign without operating its
emergency lights or siren. The plaintiff sued for the resulting injuries
alleging reckless disregard for public safety. 27 However, since there was
no evidence that the City of Savannah maintained a liability insurance
policy, the supreme court held that the court of appeals properly affirmed
the lower court's grant of summary judgment based on the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. 28

21. Id. at 188, 521 S.E.2d at 82.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 188-89, 521 S.E.2d at 82-83.
24. In so ruling, the Georgia Court of Appeals overruled Blumsack v. Bartow County,
223 Ga. App. 392, 477 S.E.2d 642 (1996). In Blumsack, a county vehicle collided with a
citizen's vehicle, killing the citizen driver as he pulled out of a parking lot. A private auto
mechanic-not a county official-was test driving the county vehicle when the collision
occurred. The plaintiff argued that the previous negligent maintenance of the county
vehicle by a county mechanic was the cause of the fatality. The front bumper of the vehicle
had been replaced with a more dangerous bumper bracket which served as a mount for an
electric winch. Id. at 392-94, 477 S.E.2d at 643-45. The court in Blumsack held that "[m]ere
ownership or negligent maintenance cannot, by itself, waive sovereign immunity." Id. at
396, 477 S.E.2d at 646. The court disregarded the categories of maintenance and ownership,
holding that there could be no waiver unless the official was the one actually using the
vehicle. Id. at 395, 477 S.E.2d at 645.
25. 274 Ga. 122, 549 S.E.2d 341 (2001).
26. Id. at 122, 549 S.E.2d at 343.
27. Id. at 122, 549 S.E.2d at 343-44.
28. Id. at 127, 549 S.E.2d at 347.
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The second case involved a civilian who was killed in Peach County,
Georgia when a fleeing suspect crossed the center line of a two-lane road
and collided head-on with the decedent's vehicle. The decedent's wife
sued the pursuing officer and the county for wrongful death alleging that
the officer acted in reckless disregard of law enforcement procedure by
choosing to continue the high-speed pursuit, which lead to her husband's
death. 29 In this case, Peach County maintained a liability insurance
policy that covered claims resulting from the operation of motor vehicles.
Sovereign immunity was waived, and the plaintiff was allowed to pursue
her claim. 30
In its opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court called attention to the
inconsistent and unfair results caused by the failure to require local
government entities to maintain liability insurance policies for motor
vehicles. 31 The court noted that injured citizens were left at the mercy of
the local government and its decision whether to purchase liability
insurance, providing no incentive for governing bodies to maintain such
a policy. 32 Ultimately, the court urged the Georgia General Assembly to
remove the discretion that local governing bodies had in purchasing
liability insurance, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(a), and instead,
make it a requirement. 33
The court spoke, and the General Assembly listened. 34 House Bill
112835 was passed in 2002, to become effective January

1, 2005.36

However, the General Assembly did not make the change suggested by
the court in Cameron; in fact, the General Assembly did not amend
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(a) at all. 37 Without removing discretion, the General
Assembly provided a way for plaintiffs to waive any local government's
sovereign immunity, regardless of whether it maintained liability
insurance.3 8 In doing so, the General Assembly established O.C.G.A. §
36-92-2 and amended O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b)39 by adding the following

§

29. Id. at 122-23, 549 S.E.2d at 344.
30. Id. at 127, 549 S.E.2d at 347.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Wolff et al., supra note 2, at 347.
35. Ga. H.R. Bill 1128, Reg. Sess., 2002 Ga. Laws 579 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
33-24-51 (2002)).
36. Wolff et al., supranote 2, at 347.
37. Ga. H.R. Bill 1128, 2002 Ga. Laws 579.
38. Id.
39. The amended version of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) reads, in part, as follows:
The sovereign immunity of local government entities for a loss arising out of
claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is waived as provided in
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opening sentence: "The sovereign immunity of local government entities
for a loss arising out of claims for the negligent use of a covered motor
vehicle is waived as provided in Code Section 36-92-2."40 An additional
amendment to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) was made qualifying when
immunity would be waived if the local government maintained liability
insurance.41 Rather than the mere purchase of liability insurance being
the sole criteria for waiving sovereign immunity-assuming injury arose
by reason of ownership, maintenance, operation, or use-the local
government entity was now required to purchase liability insurance "in
an amount greater than the amount of immunity waived as in Code
Section 36-92-2."42
The newly established O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2 states, "The sovereign
immunity of local government entities for a loss arising out of claims for
the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is waived up to ... $500,000
because of bodily injury or death of any one person in any one
occurrence." 43 Starting January 1, 2005, a local government's lack of
liability insurance on a motor vehicle involved in an accident no longer
barred plaintiffs from bringing suit. 44 While it might seem this
amendment would open the floodgates for claims against local
government entities, that was not necessarily the case.

B. Modern Application Since the Amendment
Consider the plaintiff in Gish v. Thomas,45 who filed suit on December
9, 2005, as administratrix of her son's estate. The mother asserted a
claim against Pike County, Georgia for wrongful death after her son
committed suicide in the backseat of a Pike County sheriff deputy's patrol
car. Officers arrested Jesse Gish for battery after he attacked his mother
and transported him to the Pike County Sheriffs Department where it
was determined he was suicidal. Pike County sheriff deputy William
Code Section 36-92-2. Whenever a municipal corporation, a county, or any other
political subdivision of this state shall purchase the insurance authorized by
subsection (a) of this Code section to provide liability coverage for the negligence
of any duly authorized officer, agent, servant, attorney, or employee in the
performance of his or her official duties in an amount greater than the amount
of immunity waived as in Code Section 36-92-2, its governmental immunity shall
be waived to the extent of the amount of insurance so purchased.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2 (or up to $700,000 for the injury of two or more persons resulting
from a single accident).
44. O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-51, 36-92-2.
45. 302 Ga. App. 854, 691 S.E.2d 900 (2010).
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Gilmer then transported Gish to the Clayton County Jail, which had
facilities that allowed for the constant monitoring of inmates with mental
health concerns.46
Three days later,47 Deputy Gilmer was assigned to pick up Gish from
the Clayton County Jail and transport him to his court appearance before
the Pike County Magistrate Court. After Gish's appearance, Deputy
Gilmer drove him back to the Clayton County Jail for continued mental
health monitoring. Upon arrival, Deputy Gilmer removed his loaded
service pistol from his person and placed it in the front seat of his patrol
car before exiting the vehicle. Gish then reached through the open
Plexiglass window, which separated him from the front seat, grabbed
Deputy Gilmer's loaded handgun, put the gun in his mouth, and squeezed
the trigger. 48
Pike County moved for summary judgment, claiming, inter alia,
sovereign immunity. On that issue, the trial court granted summary
judgment, to which the plaintiff appealed. 49 The plaintiff argued that
Pike County waived its sovereign immunity by purchasing an automobile
liability insurance policy. In addition, the plaintiff contended that the
court erred in holding that the claim did not "arise out of the use" of
Deputy Gilmer's patrol car.50 The Georgia Court of Appeals held that
statutes providing for the waiver of sovereign immunity "are in
derogation of the common law and thus [should] be strictly construed
against a finding of waiver."5 1 While noting that a bright-line definition
of "use" is elusive, the court held that "the question to be answered is
whether the injury 'originated from,' 'had its origin in,' 'grew out of,' or
'flowed from' the use of the motor vehicle as a vehicle." 52 The court

46. Id. at 854-55, 691 S.E.2d at 902--03.
47. During the initial trip to the Clayton County Jail on the day of his arrest, Gish was
seated in the backseat of the patrol car with his hands handcuffed behind his back and his
seatbelt buckled. The patrol car had a Plexiglass sliding window that remained open during
the trip. En route, Gish was somehow able to unbuckle his seatbelt and manipulate his
cuffed hands from behind his back to the front of his body. On arrival at the Clayton County
Jail, Deputy Gilmer removed his loaded service pistol from his person and placed it in the
front seat to accommodate the Clayton County Sherriff's Office policy of no handguns inside
the jail. It was not until opening the back door of the patrol car that deputy Gilmer learned
of Gish's escape from the restrained position. Gish was then unloaded and placed into the
custody of the Clayton County Sheriffs Office. Id. at 856, 691 S.E.2d at 903.
48. Id. at 856-57, 691 S.E.2d at 903.
49. Id. at 855, 691 S.E.2d at 902.
50. Id. at 860, 691 S.E.2d at 905.
51. Id. at 860, 691 S.E.2d at 906.
52. Id. at 861, 691 S.E.2d at 906 (quoting Saylor v. Troup Cty., 225 Ga. App. 489, 490,
484 S.E.2d 298, 299 (1997)). In Saylor, an inmate fell onto a swing blade as he sharpened
it. Prior to the fall, the plaintiff attached the swing blade to a vice, which was attached to
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ultimately agreed with the trial court's holding that, at the time of the
suicide, Deputy Gilmer's patrol car functioned more as a holding cell.53
As such, the injury did not relate to the "use" of the patrol car as a motor
vehicle; therefore, sovereign immunity was not waived. 54 This case
demonstrates that even with the new amendment, the court must still
determine the scope of the meaning of ownership, maintenance,
operation, or use55 if the local government entity maintains liability
insurance.
In McDuffie v. Coweta County,56 an inmate was killed while replacing
a tire tube on a prison tractor when the tire exploded during repair. The
explosion caused the tire to impact the inmate's chest with deadly force.
Coweta County owned the tractor, the tire, and all other equipment at
the shop. The inmate's estate filed suit for wrongful death, alleging
negligent supervision by the supervising officer. The county moved for
summary judgment on the grounds of sovereign immunity, and the court
granted the motion. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court
erred by failing to waive sovereign immunity despite the county's
7
liability insurance policy. 5

The county argued that the tractor was not a motor vehicle and
repairing or replacing a tire does not fall within the scope of

the bumper of a county-owned van. Another inmate accidently bumped into the plaintiff
with a riding tractor causing the fall. 225 Ga. App. at 489, 484 S.E.2d at 299. The court held
that the plaintiff was merely using the van's bumper to hold the vice and that the van itself
was only remotely related to the injury; thus, the court held, the injury did not result from
the "use" of the van. Id. at 490, 484 S.E.2d at 299.
53. Gish, 302 Ga. App. at 861, 691 S.E.2d at 906.
54. Id.
55. Compare the holding in this case with the holding in McElmurray v. AugustaRichmond County, 274 Ga. App. 605, 618 S.E.2d 59 (2005). In McElmurray, the plaintiffs
were landowners who owned and operated a dairy and crop farm. The plaintiffs made an
agreement with the local government to use their land to dispose of sewage sludge from a
local water treatment plant. The county told the plaintiffs the sludge was not toxic and
would act as a beneficial fertilizer for their land. Several years after the agreement was
made, the plaintiffs began experiencing significant issues relating to their crops and
cattle-everal of their cattle died. The plaintiffs filed suit against the county claiming that
it waived sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 by maintaining an insurance
policy on the vehicles used to spread the sludge; the court disagreed, barring the plaintiffs'
claims. 274 Ga. App. at 605-07, 618 S.E.2d at 61-62. On appeal, the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the use of motor vehicles to spread the sludge on plaintiffs'
property constituted "use" pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(a). 274 Ga. App. at 613, 618
S.E.2d at 66. The courts seem to be inconsistent in their definition of the term "use" under
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(a).
56. 299 Ga. App, 500, 682 S.E.2d 609 (2009).
57. Id. at 500-01, 682 S.E.2d at 611.
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maintenance.5 8 The Georgia Court of Appeals held that a tractor is a
motor vehicle as defined by the county's insurance policy, 59 and reversed
the trial court's decision, holding that "[m]aintenance covers all acts
which come within its ordinary scope and meaning," which includes
repairing or replacing a tire.60
There have been two more important developments concerning
sovereign immunity and O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51. The following case
acknowledged and clarified these developments in a way that shaped the
discussion of sovereign immunity and O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51.
In Gates v. Glass,6 1 Jonathan Glass, an inmate in Troup County, was
killed after a rock struck him in the throat during a prisoner work detail.
Glass and another inmate were assigned to operate tractors with
attached bush hogs on the side of the road when Glass's tractor became
stuck in a ditch. Donrell Gates, a supervising officer, instructed Glass to
attach a chain to his tractor so the other inmate could pull it out. As Glass
attached the chain to his tractor, the other inmate accidently engaged his
tractor's bush hog, projecting a rock into the air, which pierced Glass's
throat. Glass died several hours later. 62
Glass's estate filed suit against Troup County for wrongful death and
the county filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds of
sovereign immunity. The plaintiff argued that the county's immunity
was waived, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51, due to the existence of a
liability insurance policy. In response, the county argued that "by
revising OCGA § 33-24-51(b) in 2002. .. the legislature demonstrated its
intent to apply the more narrow definition of 'motor vehicle' found in
OCGA § 36-92-1(6)63 in determining whether a local government waived
sovereign immunity." 64 The trial court agreed with the county and
granted summary judgment in its favor, holding that neither a bush hog
nor a tractor could be considered a motor vehicle6 5 under O.C.G.A. § 36-

58. Id. at 504-05, 682 S.E.2d at 613-14.
59. The policy defined motor vehicle as any land motor vehicle designed for travel on
public roads. Id. at 504, 682 S.E.2d at 613. The court reasoned that the tractor's rubber
tires allowed it to travel on public roads, thus, making it a motor vehicle. Id.
60. Id. at 504-05, 682 S.E.2d at 613-14.
61. 291 Ga. 350, 729 S.E.2d 361 (2012).
62. Id. at 350-51, 729 S.E.2d at 362.
63. O.C.G.A. § 36-92-1(6) (2017).
64. Gates, 291 Ga. at 351-52, 729 S.E.2d at 362.
65. In 2002, the legislature enacted O.C.G.A. § 36-92-1 to expressly define the terms to
be used in that chapter, including the term "motor vehicle." Gates, 291 Ga. at 353, 729
S.E.2d at 363. Code section 36-92-1(6) defines motor vehicle as "any automobile, bus,
motorcycle, truck, trailer, or semitrailer, including its equipment, and any other equipment
permanently attached thereto, designed or licensed for use on the public streets, roads, and
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92-1(6).66 On appeal, however, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's decision, holding that "the previously used, broader
definition6 7 of 'motor vehicle' should be applied under OCGA § 33-2451."68 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals'
reasoning and affirmed its judgment.6 9
In reaching its decision, the supreme court pointed out a two-tiered
scheme in which local governments can be deemed to have waived
sovereign immunity in relation to accidents involving motor vehicles. 70
The first-tier, established by O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2, requires local
government entities to waive sovereign immunity up to the prescribed
limits set forth within the statute for accidents involving motor vehicles
regardless of whether a liability insurance policy exists. 7' The secondtier, as enacted by O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b), provides for the waiver of
sovereign immunity when a government entity maintains automobile
liability insurance in an amount "greater than" the limits set forth under
O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2: $500,000.72 The court concluded that in instances
involving first-tier waiver, parties are subject to the narrower definition
of motor vehicle, as defined in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-1(6).73 In instances
involving second-tier waiver, parties are subject to the broader definition
of motor vehicle as originally understood within O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51.74
Given the history of the court's holdings thus far, it is evident that
when a government entity purchases automobile liability insurance, it
opens itself up to the waiver of sovereign immunity, even if the injury
arose by reason of "maintenance" rather than "use."75 History also shows
that since January 1, 2005, a county is left open to the waiver of sovereign
immunity when someone is injured by the "negligent use" of a motor

highways of the state." O.C.G.A. § 36-92-1(6). It was this definition that gave the county
room to argue that neither a tractor nor a bush hog constituted a motor vehicle.
66. Gates, 291 Ga. at 352, 729 S.E.2d at 362.
67. See, e.g., Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 222 Ga. App. 177, 179, 474 S.E.2d 89, 92 (1996)
(backhoe is considered a motor vehicle within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51); see also
Williams v. Whitfield Cty., 289 Ga. App. 301, 303, 656 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008) (tracked
Caterpillar excavator is a motor vehicle within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51); cf.
Hewell v. Walton Cty., 292 Ga. App. 510, 513, 664 S.E.2d 875, 877 (2008) (portable tar
kettle machine is a motor vehicle as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51).
68. 291 Ga. at 352, 729 S.E.2d at 362-63.
69. Id. at 352, 729 S.E.2d at 363.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 352-53, 729 S.E.2d at 363.
73. Id. at 353, 729 S.E.2d at 363.
74. Id.
75. See McDuffie, 299 Ga. App. at 500, 682 S.E.2d at 609.
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vehicle, even when the county has not purchased liability insurance.76
The previous cases covered the majority of issues confronted by the court
regarding the waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 3324-51. One issue not addressed, however, is what happens when someone
is injured while performing maintenance on a county vehicle-one not
covered by liability insurance. The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed
this matter of first impression in Columbus Consolidated Government v.

Woody.7 7

IV. CouRT's RATIONALE

In Woody, "The sole issue before [the] Court [was] whether OCGA f§
33-24-51(b) and 36-92-2 waive[d] sovereign immunity for injuries arising
from the maintenance work performed by Woody on the garbage truck."7 8
In deciding this issue, the court relied heavily on statutory
interpretation.7 9 The court focused its attention on the first sentence of
the 2002 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b), which states, "The
sovereign immunity of local government entities for a loss arising out of
claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is waived as
provided in Code Section 36-92-2."8O Consequently, the court noted, the
first sentence of O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2 states, in part, that when loss arises
"out of claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle," sovereign
immunity is waived up to the limits set forth therein.8 1
The court then referenced the two-tier waiver scheme. 82 The first-tier
provides for the waiver of sovereign immunity regardless of the existence
of an automobile liability insurance policy, and the second-tier provides
for waiver to the extent the local government entity purchased liability

76. O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-51, 36-92-2.
77. 342 Ga. App. 233, 802 S.E.2d 718 (2017).
78. Id. at 234, 802 S.E.2d at 719.
79. Id. at 235-37, 802 S.E.2d at 719-21. The court laid out its formula for statutory
interpretation by stating that "[s]tatutes should be read according to the natural and most
obvious import of the language," id. at 237, 802 S.E.2d at 721 (quoting Integon Indem. Corp.
v. Canal Ins. Co., 256 Ga. 692, 693, 353 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1987)), and that, as a basic rule of
construction, "a statute ... should be construed to make all its parts harmonize and to give
a sensible and intelligent effect to each part, as it is not presumed that the legislature
intended that any part would be without meaning." Id. (quoting Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 747-48,
452 S.E.2d at 476, 479). The court also noted that "statutes ... providing for a waiver of
sovereign immunity are in derogation of the common law and thus are to be strictly
construed against a finding of waiver." Id. at 238, 802 S.E.2d at 721 (quoting Gish, 302 Ga.
App. at 860, 691 S.E.2d at 906).
80. Id. at 236, 802 S.E.2d at 720; O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b).
81. Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 236, 802 S.E.2d at 720; O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2(a).
82. Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 236, 802 S.E.2d at 720.
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insurance in an amount "greater than" the limits set forth in O.C.G.A. §
36-92-2.83 The court reasoned that "[t]he first sentence in OCGA § 33-2451(b) and OCGA § 36-92-2 indicate that the first-tier waiver of immunity
does not apply to 'ownership, maintenance, or operation' of a motor
vehicle." 84 These are the terms that previously controlled the waiver of
sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51.85 Now, however, the
court holds they do not apply to first-tier waiver, which controls in the
absence of an automobile liability insurance policy. 86
In coming to its conclusion, the court stated that the amended statute's
plain language clearly indicates that the legislature chose not to include
all four terms found in O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(a) when it added the new
sentence to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b), which it could have easily done, if it
so intended.87 Rather, the legislature chose to reduce the scope of firsttier waiver by limiting it to claims arising out of "negligent use"-not
ownership, maintenance, or operation.88 The court also reasoned that by
retaining the language in the second sentence of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b)
which states, "[T]he insurance authorized by subsection (a)," the
legislature again displayed its intent to further distinguish between firsttier and second-tier waiver.89 In addition, the court noted that the
repetition of "negligent use" in O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-51(b) and 36-92-2
indicate a deliberate choice by the legislature in drafting the
amendment.9 0
In conclusion, the court briefly addressed whether the plaintiffs
injuries arose from the "use" of a motor vehicle, holding that, at the time
of the welding accident, the garbage truck was "immobile and undergoing
maintenance."9 1 The court stated that "the question to be answered [was]
whether the injury originated from, had its origin in, grew out of, or
flowed from the use of the motor vehicle as a vehicle." 92 The court held
that, based on the plain language of O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-51(b) and 36-922(a), 93 there was no basis for interpreting the term "use' to encompass
the maintenance of a garbage truck. 94 The court stated that if the
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 238, 802 S.E.2d at 721.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Saylor, 225 Ga. App. at 490, 484 S.E.2d at 298-99).
O.C.G.A. § 36-92- 2 (a) (2017).
Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 238, 802 S.E.2d at 721.
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legislature intended the term "use" to include the ownership,
maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle-as it does when
considering second-tier waiver-it would have added that language to
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) to be considered when determining the scope of
first-tier waiver.9 5 The court ultimately held that the garbage truck was
not being used as a motor vehicle when the plaintiff sustained his
injuries, and therefore, the county's sovereign immunity was not
waived.96
In Judge McFadden's concurring opinion, he reluctantly agreed with
the majority.97 Judge McFadden noted that since the plaintiff did not
allege the existence of an automobile liability insurance policy, the firsttier waiver statute governed his case.98 Judge McFadden's concurring
opinion focuses on what he perceives to be a loophole in the second-tier
waiver language of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b); Judge McFadden stated that
"when a government entity purchases insurance in an amount equal to
or less than the amount of the automatic, first-tier waiver, [the
majority's] analysis would lead to a result the legislature is unlikely to
have intended."99 Judge McFadden's concurring opinion presents a
hypotheticaloo that demonstrates this unlikely intent, where a plaintiff

95. Id. at 238-39, 802 S.E.2d at 721-22.
96. Id. at 239, 802 S.E.2d at 722.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 239-40, 802 S.E.2d at 722.
100. Consider the following examples that Judge McFadden gives in his concurring
opinion regarding second-tier waiver. Keep in mind for these examples that the
government's sovereign immunity is waived up to $500,000 for injuries resulting from one
accident involving one person, according to O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2.
PlaintiffA files suit against County A for $400,000 worth of damages "arising from
the negligent maintenance of a county vehicle." Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 241, 802 S.E.2d at
723. The county maintains an automobile liability insurance policy for claims arising by
reason of "ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of a motor vehicle." Id. However, the
amount of the county's coverage is $500,000, which is not "greater than" the limits set forth
in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2; therefore, even though County A has enough insurance to cover
Plaintiff A's claim of $400,000, because its coverage does not exceed $500,000, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff A's claim. Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 241, 802 S.E.2d at
723. Compare this to the following plaintiff who sues a different county on the same claim.
Plaintiff B files suit against County B for $400,000 worth of damages "arising from
the negligent maintenance of a county vehicle." Id. County B maintains an automobile
liability insurance policy "for claims arising from ownership, maintenance, operation, or
use of a motor vehicle." Id. However, unlike County A, County B has an insurance policy
that covers up to $500,001 worth of damages-an amount "greater than" the limits set forth
in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2. Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 241, 802 S.E.2d at 723. In this scenario,
Plaintiff B obtains a second-tier waiver of sovereign immunity and can proceed against
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is barred from recovery due to a county's failure to maintain liability
insurance in an amount "greater than" the limits: $500,000.101 Judge
McFadden goes on to offer an alternative interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 3324-51(b) that would avoid this unlikely intent.1 02
Given the concerns Judge McFadden has about the public policy
implications that might result from the current language of O.C.G.A. §§
33-24-51(b) and 36-92-2, Judge McFadden suggests that the Georgia
General Assembly reconsider the language of these statutes to prevent
any unintended results or loopholes.1 0
V. IMPLICATIONS

This case presents an issue of first impression to the Georgia Supreme
Court and illuminates unintended gaps in waiver that will require either
an additional amendment to O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-51 and 36-92-2 or a novel
judicial reading of the statutes.1 04 After the court's holding in Woody,
plaintiffs injured by reason of ownership, maintenance, or operation of a
covered motor vehicle will be barred from bringing suit against a local
government entity if it does not maintain liability insurance. 105 Thus, the
injustice the court in Cameron v. Lang sought to remedy by removing
local government's discretion in maintaining automobile liability
insurance coverage, was not fully remedied with respect to ownership,
maintenance, or operation-only "use."106 Consider the plaintiff in
County B for his $400,000 negligent maintenance claim. Id. Judge McFadden states that
he sees "no reason for this disparate treatment of 'Plaintiff A' and Tlaintiff B."' Id.
101. Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 241, 802 S.E.2d at 723.
102. Id. at 241-42, 802 S.E.2d at 723-24. Judge McFadden notes that O.C.G.A. § 33-2451(b) allows for a waiver of sovereign immunity when a local government entity has
purchased automobile liability insurance, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(a), "in an
amount greater than the amount of immunity waived as in [OCGA §] 36-92-2[.]" Woody,
342 Ga. App. at 241-42, 802 S.E.2d at 723; O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b). However, as Judge
McFadden points out, "No immunity is waived for a claim of negligent maintenance (or
ownership, or operation) under OCGA § 36-92-2 because that Code section concerns the
waiver of immunity only of claims for negligent use." Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 242, 802
S.E.2d at 723. Therefore, "Because no immunity is waived for such claims under OCGA §
36-92-2, insuring against them for any amount greater than zero constitutes insuring them
'in an amount greater than the amount of immunity waived' in that statute." Woody, 342
Ga. App. at 242, 802 S.E.2d at 723. According to Judge McFadden, sovereign immunity is
arguably "waived under the plain language of OCGA § 33-24-51(b) to the extent that the
entity has purchased insurance to cover such a claim-whether or not the amount of that
insurance exceeds the dollar amounts prescribed in OCGA § 36-92-2." Woody, 342 Ga. App.
at 242, 802 S.E.2d at 723-24.
103. Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 242, 802 S.E.2d at 724.
104. Id. at 233, 802 S.E.2d at 717.
105. Id.
106. See Cameron, 274 Ga. at 122, 549 S.E.2d at 341.
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McDuffie v. Coweta County, who died while repairing a tractor tire; if the
county had not maintained liability insurance, the plaintiff would have
been barred from recovery under first-tier waiver.107 Is that the result
the Georgia General Assembly intended? What makes a plaintiff who
dies in that manner less deserving of recovery than a plaintiff injured by
"use?"10 8
Also, as noted by Judge McFadden, plaintiffs may be barred from
recovery by the doctrine of sovereign immunity due to the ambiguous
language of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b)-"in an amount greater than the
amount of immunity waived as in Code Section 36-92-2."109 In response
to the court's urging in Cameron,11 0 the General Assembly created firsttier waiver, yet simultaneously narrowed the scope of second-tier
waiver. 11 However, the extent to which second-tier waiver was narrowed
is not exactly clear. Is Judge McFadden's concern about this statutory
loophole justified?
Georgia has 535 incorporated cities.1 12 Of those cities, 285 are insured
by the Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency, meaning over 53%
of Georgia's incorporated cities are insured by just one of the providers
in the state.1 13 Out of Georgia's 159 counties, 114 115 are insured by the
Association of County Commissioners of Georgia insurance program,
meaning approximately 72% of Georgia's counties are covered by just one
of the insurance providers in the state.115 Generally, "All members of
these programs would have limits in excess of the minimums" set forth
by O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2.116 Therefore, Judge McFadden's concern about the
legislature's "unintended" result is not likely to be an issue considering
it is common practice to maintain limits in excess of the minimums.11 7

107. See McDuffie, 299 Ga. App. at 500, 682 S.E.2d at 609.
108. If the General Assembly did not intend such a distinction, it should amend O.C.GA
§§ 33-24-51(b) and 36-92-2(a) to include negligent ownership, maintenance, and operation
as actionable claims in addition to "negligent use."
109. Woody, 342 Ga. App. at 239-40, 802. S.E.2d at 722; O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b).
110. See Cameron, 274 Ga. at 122, 549 S.E.2d at 341.
111. Ga. H.R. Bill 1128, 2002 Ga. Laws 579.
112. Georgia: 2010 Census of Population and Housing, III-2, U.S. Census Bureau,
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2O10/cph-2-12.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
113. GA. MUN. ASs'N, https//www.gmanet.com/Services/In surance/Property-LiabilityInsurance.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
114. Georgia: 2010 Census of Populationand Housing, supra note 112, at 111-2.
115. Ass'n of Cty. Comm'rs of Ga. (last visited Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.accg.org
1library/insurance/IRMA.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
116. E-mail from R. Read Gignilliat, attorney, Elarbee Thompson to Clayton Kendrick,
student, Mercer University School of Law (Aug. 23, 2017, 12:06 EST) (on file with Author).
117. Id.
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Judge McFadden's consideration of this issue might be more speculative
than practical, but it makes a great point: The language of O.C.G.A. § 3324-51(b) leaves room for interpretation.
The court must always begin with the text when interpreting a
statute. 118 If the language is clear and unambiguous the analysis stops
there, but if the text gives rise to more than one plausible meaning, the
court may look outside the text for answers. 1 9 Given that the text of
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) can be interpreted in more than one way-the
majority's
interpretation
and
Judge McFadden's
alternative
interpretation-the court would have been justified in looking to
extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to better understand the
legislative intent at the time of the 2002 amendment or to ascertain the
statute's purpose. If the court had considered legislative history, it would
have found that, at the time of the amendment, an effort was being made
to make O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 fairer for injured plaintiffs who were
previously at the mercy of a local government's decision whether to
maintain automobile liability insurance.1 20 Prior to the amendment,
there was no requirement that an insurance policy's limits be in excess
of a certain amount in order for a plaintiff to recover under O.C.G.A. §
33-24-51, the mere existence of a policy sufficed.121 Why then would the
legislature add this limiting provision for second-tier waiver in the midst
of a plaintiff friendly amendment? Why exchange a plaintiff at the mercy
of a local government's discretion whether to purchase liability insurance
for a plaintiff at the mercy of a local government's discretion whether to
purchase liability insurance in an amount "greater than" the limits set
forth in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2?122

118. You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA., 293 Ga. 67, 71, 743 S.E.2d 428, 431 (2013).
119. Id.
120. See Cameron, 274 Ga. at 122, 549 S.E.2d at 341; Wolff et al., supra note 2, at 347.
121. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (2001).
122. Perhaps the "greater than" language was meant to provide that when the
government's insurance coverage is in excess of the amount waived, pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 36-92-2, the plaintiff is entitled to the full amount of coverage, not just the limits set forth
in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2. For example, Plaintiff X is injured in an automobile accident with
County X, who maintains a liability insurance policy for $750,000. According to the limits
set forth in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2, Plaintiff X is entitled to $500,000, regardless of whether
Plaintiff Xs injury was the result of negligent ownership, maintenance, operation, or use.
However, since County Xhas coverage "in an amount greater than the amount of immunity
waived as in Code Section 36-92-2, its governmental immunity shall be waived to the extent
of the amount of insurance so purchased." O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b). Therefore, in this
scenario, if one accepts this interpretation, County Xs sovereign immunity would be waived
up to $750,000, not just $500,000, meaning Plaintiff Xcould recover up to "the extent of the
amount of insurance so purchased"-$750,000. Id. However, O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(c) seems
to suggest this same proposition: "The [local government] . . . of this state shall be liable for
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Given that statutes waiving sovereign immunity are in derogation of
the common law and should be strictly construed against a finding of
waiver, 123 the court, when faced with Judge McFadden's loophole, will
likely rule against the waiver of sovereign immunity, barring the plaintiff
from recovery. If the General Assembly did not intend such a result, it
would be prudent to amend the language of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b).
The court in Woody used sound reasoning to determine that first-tier
waiver requires "negligent use," and Judge McFadden's concurring
opinion incorporated great foresight in pointing out the loophole that
could potentially bar plaintiffs from recovery. While this loophole is not
likely to be an issue, given the general practice of most government
entities when purchasing liability insurance, 124 it does call attention to
the ambiguity of the language in O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) and the need for
the General Assembly's attention. It also makes one ask the question,
should the General Assembly have taken its direction from the court in
Cameron125 and removed local government's discretion in purchasing
automobile liability insurance, making it a requirement.126 Perhaps the
best solution for Judge McFadden's second-tier waiver loophole would be
to amend the second sentence of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) to read,
"Whenever a municipal corporation .

.

. shall purchase the insurance

damages in excess of the amount of immunity waived as provided in Code Section 36-922 .. . only to the extent of the limits or the coverage of the insurance policy." O.C.G.A. § 3324-51(c) (2017).
Additionally, the language in O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) might have been intended to
discourage local government entities from purchasing insurance policies with coverage
below the limits set forth in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2. Without the "greater than" language in
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b), the statute would provide that any government entity maintaining
an insurance policy shall waive its sovereign immunity to the extent of the amount of
insurance purchased-regardless of the amount of coverage. O.C.G.A § 33-24-51(b). For
example, County Y maintains an automobile liability insurance policy in the amount of
$5,000-well below the $500,000 limit set forth in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2. Plaintiff Y sues
County Y after an automobile accident. County Ys sovereign immunity is waived, but only
to the extent of $5,000. The plaintiff is not barred from bringing suit, but stands to gain
very little. Therefore, without the "greater than" language in O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b), local
government entities would have been able to purchase insignificant liability coverage,
waive sovereign immunity for a trivial amount, and avoid the $500,000 payment required
of uninsured entities by O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2. Thus, the "greater than" language might simply
have been an attempt to prevent such unfair practices, rather than an attempt to limit
waiver.

123. Gish, 302 Ga. App. at 860, 691 S.E.2d at 906.
124. E-mail from R. Read Gignilliat, supranote 116.
125. Cameron, 274 Ga. at 127, 549 S.E.2d at 347.
126. Requiring all local government entities to purchase automobile liability insurance
would likely result in smaller government entities losing money through the cost of
maintaining a policy versus self-insuring against risk.
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. its governmental immunity shall be

waived to the extent of the amount of insurance so purchased"1 27 or to the
extent of the limits set forth in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2, whichever is
greater.1 28
VI. CONCLUSION
It is a curious paradox that the Georgia General Assembly could
simultaneously expand the waiver of sovereign immunity while
narrowing its reach. First-tier waiver requires a plaintiffs injury to arise
out of the "negligent use" of a motor vehicle, but it also prevents local
government from arguing that its lack of liability insurance shields it
from suit.129 Second-tier waiver allows plaintiffs to bring suit when

injured "by reason of ownership, maintenance, operation, or use" so long
as the local government maintains insurance coverage in an amount
"greater than" the limits set forth in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2.130 While the
2002 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) is a promising avenue for
piercing the veil of sovereign immunity, it is certainly not a windfall for
plaintiffs. In conclusion, Columbus Consolidated Government v. Woody
clarifies an issue of first impression regarding the scope of first-tier
waiver while shining light on a likely unintended loophole in second-tier
waiver. One can only wait to see if Judge McFadden's call for help will
inspire the General Assembly to act, and if so, what the result of that
action will be.
Clayton Kendrick

127. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b).
128. The Author's proposed version of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) would read as follows:
The sovereign immunity of local government entities for a loss arising out of
claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is waived as provided in
Code Section 36-92-2. Whenever a municipal corporation, a county, or any other
political subdivision of this state shall purchase the insurance authorized by
subsection (a) of this Code section to provide liability coverage for the negligence
of any duly authorized officer, agent, servant, attorney, or employee in the
performance of his or her official duties, its governmental immunity shall be

waived to the extent of the amount of insurance so purchased, or to the extent of
the limits set forth in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2, whichever is greater.
129. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b).
130. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51.

